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Abstract :
The cycle of risk management is an essential procedure for every
company in order to be able to manage its risks. The purpose of this
discussion is to explore the risk management issue of Qantas crash
in Bangkok, September 1999. Analyzing the potential factors of
the safety of flying that closely related to Qantas reputation would
give some understanding how to improve company performance.
Outlining the six steps proposed by Augustine as a guidance to
manage the crisis highlights the importance of identifying the
potential crisis, preventing it to happen or even finding the poten-
tial success from it. In addition, exploring the case can generate
some knowledge that can help one recognizing the effective ways
to deal with crisis.
Finally, by looking, at the analysis as a whole, it can be concluded
that there are always risks associated with flying. Therefore every
effort should be made by an airplane company toward the safety of
passengers. Improving knowledge of pilot is also essential to
reduce human error. Moreover, regularly updating strategy and
procedure will give awareness toward the best action that should
be taken when facing the crisis.
Keywords: risk management, managing crisis
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INTRODUCTION
This discussion is based on the case study of the crash of Qantas
QF1, a Boeing 747-400, at Bangkok Airport, September 1999.
The purpose of exploring the case is to provide some knowledge
concerning how to handle crises as well as emphasis in the importance
of risk management in every condition, particularly in dealing with hu-
man error in aircraft incidents.
The discussion will start with the facts surrounding the case as
the background to analyze the risk management issue. The primary issue
chosen and described in the case study is about safety of flying and the
associated reputation of Qantas. This exploration is based on Hibbert’s
report, 1998, that currently, the average of serious civil aircraft accidents
is about one in every week. And in over 25 years the frequency of these
accidents is predicted to rise sharply. The possibility of crashes will
increase, as more flights are demanded by continually increasing
passengers. This circumstance encourages the aviation industry to im-
prove its safety performance. Otherwise, it will encounter risks of losing
public confidence and support.
The risk of flying is a complex system that embraces the relation
ship among environmental factor, equipment factor and human factor.
These major factors are believed to be the potential causes of aircraft
incidents as well as accidents. Hence, it is essential to explore the
influence of these factors in order to beware of the crises that might
occur.
The analysis is explored with crisis management perspective
proposed by Augustine. As indicated in his article, a company of any kind
will not missed being the victim of crises. Crises strike in many ways,
range from unexpected and unconditional failures, unanticipated side
effects, gradual obsolescence, or even from natural disaster that com-
pletely beyond the control of management. However, Augustine argues
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that “almost every crisis contains itself the seed of success as well as the
root of failure”. Hence, if crisis is well managed, one can obtain the
potential success from it and gain some valuable knowledge to prevent
the next crisis to happen.
CASE STUDY
The crash of Qantas QF1 in Bangkok, Thailand
Fact surrounding the case
On 23 September 1999, approximately 10.46 p.m., flight Qantas
QF1, a Boeing 747-400, landed in Don Muang Airport Bangkok, Thai-
land. The landing process took so far from the threshold on the runway
21L that it reduced the chance for its crew to stop the aircraft before it
skidded off the end. There are many rumors and speculations about what
happened, ranging from weather condition, costs saving on engine wear,
human error, until misleading flight information. Interim report from
Australia’s Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) has referred to
Qantas’ 747 operational procedure as possible factors on the airline’s
first crash since it began flying jets. The interim report released by BASI
outlined that the captain had 16,000 hours of flying with 725 hours in
Boeing 747-400s. While the first officer had 9,000 hours flying with 5,200
on 747-400s. Another point outlined is that Bangkok’s runway 21L is
11,438 feet long; the 747 touched down 3,100 feet from the threshold,
which is displaced by 1,000 feet.
Other facts about the landing conditions include:
 There was thunderstorm and heavy rain when the 747 approached
the runway.
 The air traffic control/tower reported to QF1 that in spite of the rain,
braking conditions on the runway were good.
 Qantas QF15, which was immediately ahead of QF1, notified the
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tower that it cancelled landing because of a missed approach caused
by the heavy rain. QF1 neither heard the transmission nor were told
about FQ15’s problem.
 Approaching the runway, QF1 used “autobrakes 4” setting and the
engine thrust levers was retarded to the idle position, however when
the pilot realized that the plane would land too far down the runway,
he called for go-around.
 As the first officer advanced the thrust levers, the main wheels had
touched the runway. At the same time, as the intensity on the rain
decreased, the visibility increased and he pilot decided to cancel go-
around and pulled the thrust lever back to the idle position.
 The Crews set the flap on 25, as it was instructed by Qantas and
maximize the used if carbon brakes. It did not engage the aircraft’s
thrust reversers although by using the thrust reversers emergency
stop can be done in a shorter distance. However, it still depends on
factors such as the model and the weight of the aircraft body as well
as the weather.
 The aircraft finally stopped at the Royal Thai Airforce Gold Course,
around 300 meters from the runway’s end.
 Even though there were no injuries in the incidents, the result was
more than $100 million of damage.
Risk management issue
The crash landing of Qantas in Bangkok raises the risk manage-
ment issue associated with the safety of flying that closely related to the
reputation of Qantas. In managing the risks of flying, the relationship
among environmental factors, equipment factors and human factors are
important.
In the case of Qantas, the threat of weather contributed to the
incidents in a way that caused slippery conditions for the plane to stop
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without another help device. This heavy rain also caused low visibility.
However, in nature, the environmental factor tends to be beyond the
control of management, therefore, one should always aware and ready
to encounter it.
According to Twombly, 1998, nowadays, equipment factors such
as mechanical problems is less significant to the aircraft-related safety
incidents. Technology alone cannot deliver all the necessary safety im-
provement to stop the increasing frequency of accidents said F. Taylor,
the director of Cranfield University’s Aviation Safety Centre. Human
factor is still the one that plays the important role to control the techno-
logical progress.
While in review of several databases, human factors are far
more likely to be the significant contributors in approximately 60-85 per-
cent of all accidents and incidents. In this case, flight crew decision based
on the available information and conditions may be considered to be in-
accurate. For example, despite the hazard that aircraft would land too
far down the runway, the pilot decided to cancel go-around and retard
the thrust levers to idle and forced it to land. “This phenomenon, known
as controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), occurs when pilot misjudges the
position of the aircraft in relation to the ground, sea or mountains and the
plane crashes without the crew realizing the danger” (Taylor in Hibbert,
1998). The plane involved in CFIT incidents is likely to crash although
there is no potential problem with the plane itself. On the other hand, the
decision to land was not engaged by appropriate actions. The crew do
not use the reversers thrust to make an emergency stop in a shorter
distance.
Many interpretations can be taken from theses human errors.
One possibility is that the pilot may not have enough experience in flying
747, since he only had 725 hours on it out of his 16,000 hours record.
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Another interpretation is that the crew are not provided with the proper
procedure or they are not trained to deal with emergency.
Evidence that may be used to verify the case is the amendment
of Qantas. Its preferable procedure on landing, as reported by BASI is
the interim report, is flap 25, since it can reduce fuel, time and noise. It
also suggests the flap 30 should be chosen for landing when the filed
length requirements are critical, the runway is contaminated or for land-
ing with low visibility conditions. The amendment also stated for landing
with idle reverse thrust should normally be used for all landings if at least
300 meters of surplus runway is available. The use of idle reverse can
maximize carbon brake life, reduces noise and reduces reverse mainte-
nance costs. It should also be noted that full reverse thrust should be
used in abnormal conditions. Despite all the amendment recommenda-
tions, Qantas pilots have been trained not to use full reversers thrust. It is
suggested that idle reverse be used only when landing a 747-400. There-
fore none of the crew had the initiative to use the thrust reversers as the
wheel contacted the runway even though it was misplaced (Wainwright,
SMH, 1999)
As a result of these factors, Qantas reputation has been chal-
lenged. It should regard these factors as warning signal that risks are
always threatening the safety of flying. The next subsection will explore
how Qantas mange its crisis compared to the literature.
Managing the crisis–reflecting the concepts suggested by August-
ine (1995) to the case
Avoiding the crisis
Boeing safety engineers had done 10 years analysis of commer-
cial aircraft hull loss accidents to determine the most effective strategy
to prevent it from happening. According to M. Moodi in Proctor, 1999,
they have found that flight crew compliance with established procedures
is the single most effective one for airlines, since it can prevent more
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than 50% of the accidents studied. However, Qantas may not provide
adequate procedure to handle emergency. It may also put more empha-
sis in efficiency rather than in preventing risk to happen. Therefore, the
decision made by the pilot may be the result of not only inexperienced
judgement but also inadequate planning to avoid crisis.
Preparing to manage the crisis
Qantas should be prepared to deal with variety of undesirable
outcomes when disaster strikes. One of the preparations it can make is
regularly training the pilot. Twombly stated in his article that training is
not a one-time event. Periodic training can improve pilots’ flying tech-
nique and technology. The most effective way to train them to fly safely
is to do it on the ground – in simulators. Another worth noting point is the
claim from chief executive of Qantas that “the use of full reverse thrust
is not a standard procedure for many large airlines”. Despite of what he
claimed, airline companies should always beware of any possible emer-
gency that might arise by preparing contingency plan for pilot to antici-
pate some extraordinary conditions.
Recognizing the crisis
In handling the incidents, Qantas responded by giving statement
from its chief executive that said “we do take the whole incidents very
seriously and we have got an enormous amount of internal analysis going
on because we want to learn from it in order to preserve our reputation”.
Qantas had done what is suggested by Augustine to put open communi-
cation to the public, together with the presence of independent investiga-
tor (BASI), to build a perception that it really cared and intended to
overcome the problem. It also stated that it continued to assist the
Australian Transport Safety Board (ATSB) in its investigation to ensure
that a full inquiry process resulted in full understanding and appropriate
action.
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Containing the crisis
Qantas had stated that while waiting for the BASI final report, it
would suspend the crew. Moreover, it did not speculate the outcome,
instead, it would systematically analyze all the information to achieve
accurate findings and evaluate any lessons that emerge from the full
report later on. It also intended to provide information to the public and
particularly passengers when the data is available. However, until the
report is written, there is still no conclusion from BASI regarding the
final report of the investigation.
Resolving the crisis
Decisions should be made fast in regards to resolving the crisis.
In this case, Qantas should show what progress it had done to overcome
the problem in order to maintain its claim as the safest airline. However,
until; recently, Qantas records of incidents and accidents have challenged
its reputation.
Soon after the aircraft had been undergone $100 million in re-
pairs and in its assessment flight, it had performed in accordance with
the operational requirements of its Certificate of Airworthiness, it was
forced to cancel two weekend flights out of Hong Kong because of a
failed generator. Some other problems also occurred, sung as the
collapse of its Boeing 747-300 undercarriage while taxiing before take-
off from Rome International Airport. In other aircraft, it was reported to
have fumes entered the cabin and cockpit, while another one had its
chute inflated inside the cabin on flight (http:/www.smh.com.au/news/
0005/08/national/national03.html). Lately for the first time, Qantas safety
has been publicly questioned by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(CASA). It has announced that it would audit the airline’s safety watch-
dog because it concerns about the internal working of Qantas after se-
ries of incidents and accidents began with its first crash in Bangkok,
September 1999. CASA scheduled to investigate the company’s quality
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assurance and technical publications divisions. Firstly, it would guide com-
pany maintenance, safety and service standard, and secondly, it should
up date the procedural and technical manuals that contain complex main-
tenance requirements (Wainwright, 2000). From these facts, it can be
implied that Qantas failed to show significant progress on resolving its
problems.
Profiting from the crisis
Qantas should take the opportunity to learn from its crises it
faces. As this incident was the first time happening since it began to fly
jets, it should learn that taking into account all the possible safety risks
that might arise could prevent the next crisis to occur. This experience
may also create knowledge to improve its service as well as its reputa-
tion to gain more trust from the public.
LESSONS TO BE LEARNT
Some lessons can be learnt from Qantas crash in Bangkok. Firstly,
from the discussion above it can be implied that Qantas is concern with
the cost saving so that it can be implied that Qantas is concern with the
cost saving so that it considers using the most efficient braking systems
in its preferred procedure. However, the priority should be put more on
the safety of flying and any risks associated with it. This can include the
safety risks of passengers, the cost of the incident itself, such as cost on
investigation and damage, as well as the social risk of threat by the com-
pany and the risk of losing public trust. Therefore, every effort should be
made toward these risks.
Secondly, every crew member should have regular training to
improve flying techniques and technology as well as to grow the profes-
sionalism. This program can assure to reduce human error effectively,
since it is the only way pilots can maintain their capacity in emergency
and other critical skills. Even high flying hours and experiences can not
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be substituted with the training. The safest and most effective way to
train pilots is through ground-in simulators. (Twombly, 1998).
The next lesson that can be drawn from the incidents is the
importance of always updating the strategy and manual procedures of
flying in accordance with technological progress and changing environ-
ment. Furthermore, authorities and accurate procedures must be given
so that the crews know exactly what best alternative of action should be
taken when facing the emergency or crisis.
CONCLUSION
In general, it can be concluded that it is obvious that there
always be risks associated with flying. How it will be prevented and
handled are the most important things that should be learnt. Augustine
suggested that listing all type of crises is impossible to do. However, in
this case, in order to manage the crisis, Qantas should identify every
possible thing that might be the potential cause of incidents, measure the
likelihood of the risk to happen and the severity of consequences. It
should also take into account the estimate cost associated with the risk.
This step is known as risk analysis.
Having identified the risk and the potential crises, Qantas should
be prepared with the six treatment steps described above and carry out
scenario planning. According to Sadgrove, Qantas should be ready with
contingency plans for each potential crisis area. The plan should contain
strategies to be executed in the event of crisis and alternative treatments
to be undertaken. This include giving authorities to take actions, updating
procedure and manuals, maintain high quality assurance in accordance
with safety and service standard as well as regularly training the crews
to improve their technique and skills. Moreover, Qantas should bear in
mind that these strategies must be updated regularly in accordance with
the technological progress and changing environment, as has been
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mentioned above. In particular, it is necessary for Qantas to carry out
periodic tests on its contingency planning through simulator and let every
personnel involved practices the procedure to handle crises.
Another factor that might also significant is operational factors.
Those factors are the selection and training policies of flight crews, as-
signment policies in relation to the distribution of experienced crew, mini-
mization of flight crew fatigue, regular checks on crew members’ health,
and policies on pre-flight information.
Perhaps if Qantas put more effort on managing its risks, it may
be able to avoid series of incidents and accidents from happening. The
reputation of Qantas as the safest airline in the world may not be publicly
questioned as well.
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